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A Law of No Gods, No Masters -
Developing and Defending a
Participatory Legal System'
ByMATr HALLING*
Argentina was facing one of the worst economic crises in its
history at the beginning of this decade, leading to millions of lost jobs
and thousands of factory closures.' In response, over fifteen thousand
Argentine workers to date have taken over the closed factories and
are operating them themselves Workers manage all of the
complexities of the enterprise without a corporate hierarchy or
professional management.' The Zanon ceramics factory, closed in
2001 and "recuperated" by the workers soon after, is illustrative:
every worker is paid the same wage (with a limited seniority
exception), there are no hierarchies of personnel or administration,
workers select representatives at assembly meetings, and the factory
is run as a direct democracy. The Argentine State has been hostile
' Title is inspired from No GODS, No MASTERS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ANARCHISM
(Daniel Guerin ed., Paul Sharkey trans., AK Press 2005) (1980).
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, May 2009.
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1. Marie Trigona, Worker Self-Management in Argentina, ZNET, May 25, 2006,
http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/3821.
2. Adam David Cole says that the factory movement involves 200 businesses
and 15,000 workers as of Winter 2007. Adam David Cole, Note, You Say You Want
a Revolution: Argentina's Recovered Factory Movement, 30 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMp. L. REV. 211, 229 (2007).
3. Trigona, supra note 1.
4. Id.
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towards these worker collectives,5 which is not surprising given that
the workers did not pay for the property they seized.
Several activists have characterized the recuperated factory
movement, somewhat idealistically, as a movement for a self-
managed society. University of Buenos Aires Professor Andr6s
Ruggeri emphasizes that the movement is motivated more by worker
desperation than a new political vision.6 Ruggeri also speculates that
one reason the Argentine government is not violently repressing the
recuperated factories is because the movement is not intended as a
direct threat to the state.7 The end goal of a recuperated factory is to
try and compete in the same capitalist market as everyone else."
However, it is premature to categorize the movement in Argentina as
a temporary self-management arrangement that will inevitably evolve
back into corporate hierarchies.9 Maybe these new factories do
represent something new. In any event, the courage of the workers in
Argentina has inspired others to consider the viability of a self-
managed society.
The factory recuperation movement in Argentina has not gone
unnoticed by the International Project for a Participatory Society
("IPPS"), an activist organization focused on developing a vision for a
new and fairer society. ° The group, which includes Noam Chomsky,
Howard Zinn, and lesser known activists and professors from all over
the world, believes that a participatory society, ("parsociety"), has
four core values: (1) solidarity, (2) diversity, (3) equity, and (4) self-
management." These values are interpreted as a rejection of
centralized states, privately owned property, and any form of political
or economic elite.
IPPS is using the word "participatory" in a more radical way than
typical political science literature. Participatory institutions are
5. Trigona, supra note 1.
6. Andrds Ruggeri, The Worker-Recovered Enterprises in Argentina: The
Political and Socioeconomic Challenges of Self-Management, CENTER FOR GLOBAL





10. International Project for a Participatory Society, http://www.zmag.org/zpar
econ/ippstop.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2008). IPPS is currently renovating their
website; in the meanwhile, all membership inquiries should be directed to Znet
Policy Editor Chris Spannos at chris.spannos@zmag.org.
11. Id
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generally advocated for as an improvement to, rather than a
replacement for, modern representative democracy. 12  This work
adopts the IPPS' use of "participatory": a vision of a new society with
new institutions. In short, a parsociety attempts to create as much
individual empowerment and freedom "as one can imagine short of
trampling on the comparative freedom of others."'3
Some members of IPPS have already developed a participatory
vision for certain elements of society. Longtime activist Michael
Albert, a founder of IPPS, wrote in his book Parecon (participatory
economics) that parsociety's values suggest a rejection of both
capitalism and communism. 4  Parecon instead advocates a new
economic model with worker and consumer councils deliberating
together to shape production and consumption in industrialized
society. 5 In 2005, Professor Stephen Shalom introduced a vision for a
parpolity (participatory politics) in which local councils make
decisions, federate into larger communities, and in so doing build up
the political structure in a radically new way.' 6 Although Shalom sets
up a basic judicial structure,'7 Shalom has yet to discuss a parpolity's
legal implications.
The courage of the workers in Argentina and the participatory
theory of IPPS inspire an idea: What would the legal system of a
parsociety look like? What existing legal tools can be used to help
understand the consequences of "participatory law?" An activist
alternative worldview, such as a parsociety, may be treated with
12. E.g., Kevin O'Leary, SAVING DEMOCRACY 19-22 (2006) (noting that a big
society requires elites, so the goal for new political visions should be to allow greater
participation in the national representative system). O'Leary says that removing all
political and economic inequality to improve participation "is both highly improbable
and unwise," because eliminating these inequalities would "trample on basic civil and
economic liberties." Id. at 53. Parsociety is indeed trying to remove elites and
inequalities, difficult to achieve though that may be. For responses to O'Leary's
implication that a parsociety would trample over human rights laws protecting civil
and economic liberties, see Part III of this note. For a law journal article using the
term participatory in the non-activist sense of the word, see Christiana Ochoa, The
Relationship of Participatory Democracy to Participatory Law Formation, 15 IND. J.
OF GLOBAL L. STUDIES (forthcoming 2008).
13. Michael Albert, PARECON 263 (2003). Though Albert is talking only about a
participatory economy, this idea resonates throughout parsociety theory.
14. Id. at 78-85.
15. Id. at 91-102.
16. Stephen Shalom, ParPolity. Political Vision for a Good Society, ZNET, Nov.
2005, available at http://www.zmag.org/shalompol.htm.
17. Id. at $ 13-14.4.
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skepticism; admittedly many such visions tend to clothe a particular
interest or preference in universal language. 8 However, even if
lawyers doubt the stated advantages of parsociety, it may nevertheless
be possible to benefit from discussing and developing a theory of
participatory law.
Part I of this note develops a legal vision for parsociety:
participatory law or "parlaw." Part II will then examine parlaw's
remarkable similarity to existing international law. Finally, Part III
will analyze a threshold question raised by parlaw: why would
individuals obey laws if there is no state demanding compliance? In
order to answer the threshold question, Part III will look to
international treaty compliance research to estimate if and why
people would comply with parlaw.
The issues are relevant to both participatory activists and the
legal profession. If parlaw resembles international law, then
participatory activists could counter critics by showing that the legal
system behind their vision is possible at a global level. If
participatory (and, by extension, international) law is built on a more
just and fair foundation than domestic law, then international law
may serve as a model for challenges to and changes in domestic laws.
This counterintuitive proposition suggests a new approach to
international law that may help justify or explain the workings of the
international legal system.
This note develops an overarching vision for a participatory legal
system, rather than detailing how particular branches of law might
change in a parsociety. There are many questions beyond the general
scope of this work that would be interesting for further
contemplation. How would corporate or property law change in a
world where private ownership of the means of production is
"removed from the economic picture?"19 Would intellectual property
law cease to exist altogether, or would it retain some application?
How would procedural and evidentiary law change in the courtrooms
of a parsociety? What kinds of constitutional rights are protected?
These are all intriguing questions, but a basic framework has to be
18. E.H. Carr calls this cloaking of interests in the language of universal justice
Walewski's maxim, after the French Foreign Minister who advised Bismarck that
such was the business of a diplomat. E.H. Carr, THE TWENTY YEARS CRISIS (1939),
reprinted in FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 29 (Oona
Hathaway & Harold Koh eds., 2005) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS].
19. Albert, supra note 13, at 90.
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designed and explained before this more concrete discussion can take
place. This note merely aspires to propose a legal system based on
participatory values and to show how many of its distinctive features
have already been implemented in the legal world.
I. How Law Works Within a Parsociety
A. Justification for a Participatory Polity
1. The Current System: Modern Democracy
To understand why parsociety advocates reject the traditional
power relations in a modern democracy, it is worth briefly exploring
the current system's ground rules. A fundamental assumption of
democratic philosophy is that a government cannot be legitimate
unless the people freely consent to empower it." Freedom and
consent are now considered central values in good government;" no
serious thinker today advocates for the old days of subservience to a
king, even a benevolent king. Inviting deliberation to secure consent
for every political problem is impossible in a large society, so
representatives are elected to enact the people's will. Even if one did
not get the representative of choice, consent to be bound is implied
by continued membership in the state.2 These points merely restate
the classical social contract theory; men hypothetically consent to an
absolute power, which, while it constrains their behavior, forms states
20. This idea is expressed in different ways. Government is deriving their "just
powers from the consent of the governed" in the Declaration of Independence. THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Rousseau described the same
idea by declaring "every man being born free and master of himself, no one may on
any pretext whatsoever subject him without his consent." Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 123 (Victor
Gourevich trans., 1997) (1762), available at http://www.constitution.org/jjr/
socon_04.htm. Professor Robert Paul Wolff calls it extending the "[moral] duty of
autonomy to the realm of collective action." Robert Paul Wolff, IN DEFENSE OF
ANARCHISM 22 (1970).
21. These values overlap with each other. There is not absolute freedom in
democracy, but the limits of freedom are consented to. Rousseau, supra note 20, at
53 (men can be legitimately compelled to obey the law when they resign their free
will to the general will).
22. This idea goes back to Plato's Crito. "If any one of you stands his ground
when he can see how we administer justice.. . we hold that by so doing he has in fact
undertaken to do anything that we tell him." Plato, THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF
PLATO, INCLUDING THE LETTERS 37 (Hugh Tredennick trans., Princeton University
Press 1964) (360 B.C.E.). Cf Phillip Pettit, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF
FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (Oxford University Press 1997).
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for the greater good of all. 3
Every American high school student is given this tidy
explanation for why modern democracy works, but consent is not
preserved so neatly in practice. First, the complexity of the issues, the
necessity of technical knowledge, and the secrecy involved in national
security decisions all separate the representatives from the people.
The end result is an "elective guardianship" rather than a
democracy. 24  Second, unlike a principal-agent relationship, an
individual voter can only vote their specific preferences to the extent
their views conform to a limited number of party platforms (platforms
the voter did not participate in making). It is extremely difficult for
displeased constituents to recall their representatives, and even if
successful, the voter must again choose from the same party
platforms. Third, any hypothetical consent to a social contract fails if
people lack the freedom to not enter the contract.25 Instead, a
person's only "choice" is to forfeit freedom and obey, or resist and
bear the consequences.26
This situation is democracy in name alone; a "benevolent elective
kingship" could create a comparable relationship between governors
and governed.27  Representatives can vote independently of their
constituents on any number of issues. Members of the public
endeavoring to keep track of their representatives are unable to
because of the complexity of the issues and classified information.
This power structure creates an escalating disconnect with the public
as political issues become more complex. Being denied relevant
information and access to politics causes people to become more
dependent on their representatives' judgments and less able to verify
23. This idea is first stated in the mid 1600s. Thomas Hobbes, LEVIATHAN
(Richard Tucker ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1651). As Professor Joanne
Wright describes, "[t]he foundation of Hobbes's social contract is consent. Men make
a choice to consent to absolute power rather than to continue to exist in an unlivably
insecure condition of war." Joanne H. Wright, ORIGIN STORIES IN POLITICAL
THOUGHT: DISCOURSES ON GENDER, POWER, AND CITIZENSHIP 58 (University of
Toronto Press 2004).
24. Wolff, supra note 20, at 31.
25. See Lysander Spooner, No TREASON: THE CONSTITUTION OF No AUTHORITY
(1867), available at http://www.lysanderspooner.org/notreason.htm (arguing that
state membership is not a contract because the government will enforce laws even
against people who do not wish to enter such a contract).
26. Wolff, supra note 20, at 69-70 ("all states achieve their legitimacy only by
means of the citizens' forfeit of their autonomy, and hence are not solutions to
(making autonomy compatible with state authority)").
27. Id at 30.
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if the government is responding to their concerns.' The public is
forced to rely on the unwavering benevolence of their leaders; thus
the law created by such a system cannot meaningfully be said to
derive from consent.
There are two responses to these critiques: i) "so what?" and ii)
the current system is a necessary evil. As for the first response, the
argument would be that, even if democracy is not preserved, a
benevolent king (or the intelligentsia, or the vanguard party, etc.)
could be a good thing so long as well-intentioned, well-educated
leaders are put in charge. Professor Shalom describes the mistake of
those who justify non-democratic rule by a better qualified elite as
follows:
[The error is] not in thinking that there is lots of ignorance out
there; nor in thinking that debilitating life circumstances often
interfere with people understanding their true interests. Their
mistake [is] in assuming that they were free of self-interest or
ignorance, and that they knew the interests of others, with enough
certainty to warrant suppressing those who disagreed. 9
Defending a lack of democratic process by pointing to the
public's ignorance or false consciousness has justified horrific tyranny
and untoward bloodshed for centuries. The "So what?" argument is
severely lacking.
The second response, that the current system is a necessary evil,
is more compelling and will take the rest of this note to answer. Even
though representation may offer more freedom in theory than in
practice, no better alternative presently exists. Reform proposals
note these issues, but think the system can be saved by giving the
public a more deliberative say in society ° For example, political
scientist Kevin O'Leary advocates for deliberative Assemblies and a
national People's House to complement the American House of
28. The reliance on government secrecy in the United States has been
"unprecedented" during the George W. Bush administration, according to the highly
respected Secrecy Report Card created by Open the Government. OPEN THE
GOVERNMENT, SECRECY REPORT CARD 2007 5 (2007), http://www.openthegover
nment.org/otg/SRC2007.pdf. Though sometimes government secrecy may be
necessary, secrecy needs to be used in "strictly limited and specified contexts" in
order to prevent the aforementioned representative-public disconnect. Id.
29. Stephen Shalom, Parpolity A Political System for a Good Society, in REAL
UTOPIA: PARTICIPATORY SOCIETY FOR THE 21' CENTURY 25 (Chris Spannos ed., AK
Press 2008). Shalom was speaking of how Leninists justified nondemocratic rule in
Russia, but the quote has broader application than revolutionary Russia.
30. E.g., O'Leary, supra note 12.
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Representatives and Senate.31 These bodies would involve more
citizens in the political process in an attempt to create a more
representative government. However, 0' Leary's Assemblies can
only make advisory opinions and the People's House lacks the full
power of the House or Senate.32 In all meaningful respects, the
hierarchy of power remains unchanged. This proposal does not and
cannot fully solve modern democracy's consent problems until people
have the maximum authority possible to manage the diversity of their
interests.
2. Creating a Participatory Polity
Parsociety attempts to address modern democracy's
shortcomings by radically redistributing societal power.33 Society
would primarily be run by local councils in which all citizens are
entitled to a direct say in their governance. Councils would decide
how to manage basic social services and production-consumption
patterns.34 Shalom estimates that the smallest unit would be a
"primary council" comprising only 25-50 people. 5 These councils
would then join with councils from other communities and set
regional policy. Consequently, society is rebuilt from the "bottom
up." The basic idea is to have decentralized authority; the new
arrangement is organized more like a honeycomb rather than a spider
web.36 No state currently embodies this vision, but it is theoretically
possible. If a state is just a particular set of relationships then, as
Professor Thom Holterman suggests, "[w]hy not have the
relationships structured differently?"37
31. O'Leary, supra note 12, at 89-100.
32. Id. at 89, 98-99.
33. For an excellent collection of essays on how parsociety affects all aspects of
life (not just legal or political), see Spannos, supra note 29.
34. Albert devises an ingenious allocation method where consumer councils
interact with worker's councils to create a decentralized economic plan that balances
production and consumption. Albert, supra note 13, at 118-47. Within this plan,
worker's salaries are determined by their effort and sacrifice, in contrast to salaries
being determined by worker's physical assets or human capital. Id at 28-38, 112-18.
Consumer councils also serve as the political councils referred to throughout this
note. Shalom, supra note 16, at $ 10.2.1.
35. Shalom, supra note 16, at $ 5.2.
36. This language is taken from Professor Thom Holterman's essay on the legal
implications of anarchism. Thom Holterman, Anarchist Theory of Law and the
State, in LAW AND ANARCHISM 16 (Thom Holterman & Henc van Maarseveen eds.,
Black Rose Books 1984).
37. Id
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B. The Legal Structure of a Participatory Society: Parlaw
Any societal restructuring poses challenging questions, including
how a parsociety's legal order would work. Council democracy with
collective resource ownership implicates several types of law:
constitutional law for the society's organization, contract law for
inter-council agreements, customary law for the development of
norms and rules, and procedural law to tie it all together.3" Parlaw is
designed to realize modern democracy's unfulfilled promise: law is
only legitimate if it flows freely from the people.
Any legal system underpinning a parsociety will have a few
signature principles: (1) the primacy of voluntary association, (2) an
increased role of custom, and (3) a new federal division of political
power. Each of these aspects will be analyzed in turn.
1. Voluntary Association
Like modern democracy, parlaw's obligations are founded on
consent. However the latter more carefully reflects consent because
it is based upon the public's informed and deliberative decisions.
Parlaw's legitimacy comes from the fact that citizens, via councils,
directly debated and shaped how the law should function. Thus if the
law is violated, the violator has directly consented to any legal penalty
through mutual association. Unlike the American Constitution,
participatory law privileges local council laws over federal laws unless
the law's effect extends beyond the local area.39 Laws of local or
individual impact' ° could vary from one primary council to the next:
38. Although criminal punishment is consistent with a parsociety, other stateless
society advocates have emphasized both a rehabilitative approach and the fact that
crime should drop if wealth is shared. Specifically, "[in an anarchist society],
criminals being now only aberrations, they are to be regarded as sick and demented;
the issue of crime, which today occupies so many judges, lawyers, and jailers, will
diminish in social significance and become a simple entry under the philosophy of
medicine." James Guillaume, IDEAS ON SOCIAL ORGANIZATION (1876), reprinted in
NO GODS, No MASTERS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ANARCHISM 261 (Daniel Guerin ed.,
Paul Sharkey trans., AK Press 2005) (1980), available at http://www.mar
xists.org/reference/archive/guillaume/works/ideas.htm.
39. The idea that federal law has preemptive power over state law is in the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The "Federalism"
heading in this section better explains how higher level councils handle laws of non-
local effect.
40. How a court would decide the scope of a law's impact is currently unresolved
at IPPS. Courts could demand weighted votes so that local interests count more but
could be superseded by a non-local supermajority. Another option is for courts to do
a qualitative analysis balancing the local and regional interests similar to the one used
2009]
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euthanasia, surrogate motherhood, drug legalization, and abortion
are all possible examples. Furthermore, parlaw better protects
consent by making secession a "constitutional right."41
In a system of parlaw, the right of secession, though
constitutional, is not absolute." For example, a small community with
vast oil resources should be unable to secede without first promising
to equitably share that resource. 43 An apt analogy can be made to
divorce law, where a wealthier spouse is required to share certain
44
resources.
Given the broad right of secession, why would parlaw not
descend into mere power struggles among competing factions? The
answer is that parsociety's relative wealth equality (resources are
shared as per parecon) creates a community interdependence so deep
that withdrawing from society risks marginalization from the rest of
the world." Nation states giving up power for the sake of
interdependence historically stems from economic forces: the post-
war European integration, for example, was primarily a byproduct of
economic necessity.46 Likewise, a parsociety is not based on altruism
and sunshine: though secession is permitted, a small federation of
communities forbidden from possessing disproportionate wealth has
considerable incentive to negotiate any differences.
2. Custom
While much of the previous discussion of parlaw focuses on
creating law through a stream of voluntary contracts, another basis of
obligation must be customary practice. The only way to order such
an infinitely complex group of communities is to emphasize
in procedural due process cases. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)
(evaluating whether due process is met by looking at the government's interest, the
risk of erroneous deprivation, and the individual's interest).
41. Shalom, supra note 16, at T 6.7.
42. Id. at 6.9.1.
43. Id.
44. Id. at $ 6.8.
45. Other scholars have spoken of the negative relationship between
interdependence and secession. Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by
Decentralized Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1415 (1997) ("the existence of
substantial interdependence simultaneously diminishes the need for secession").
46. See Alan S. Milward, THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE NATION-STATE (1992).
For a summary of Milward's thesis, see David M. Reilly, The European Rescue of the
Nation-State. By Alan S. Milward, Berkeley, California: University of California
Press, 1992., 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 540 (1995).
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unwritten, or even unarticulated, customary practices. When people
engage in customary practice because they feel legally obliged to do
so, the practice becomes customary law.47
Customary law is legitimate because communities, absent state
coercion, have endorsed particular conduct that is considered fair and
reasonable. In other words, customary law rests on implied consent."8
Because parlaw is likewise predicated on consent, it is possible to
abstain, withdraw, or alter customary law, provided there is advance
notice and a consistent objection to the practice. 9 For example,
traffic laws in a parsociety will likely change little from the present;
people will drive on the same side of the street as before out of
convention and for the sake of safety. However, if a community
wanted to drive on the other side of the road, they could by making a
clear objection in a reasonable timeframe.
3. Federalism
Parlaw is based on a type of federalism where one has control
over decisions proportional to the degree to which one is affected. °
In this note, federalism is defined simply as the division of power
between a federal government and regional governments." However,
47. This definition of custom law is taken from the international law, which
defines custom as Opiniojuris sive necessitatis (state practice that is accepted as law).
Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-11 (6th ed. 2003).
48. This implied consent basis for customary law is accepted in both older and
modern times. See Monsieur de Vattel, THE LAW OF NATIONS, preliminaries § 27
(1758), available at http://www.constitution.org/vattel/vattel-pre.htm (custom law is
based on "tacit consent"); see also Jianming Shen, The Basis of International Law;
Why Nations Observe, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L. 287, 317 (1997) (rejecting arguments
against implied consent in international law). The main argument against an implied
consent theory is that some states may be forced adopt customs due to power politics
rather than out of some sort of implied equitable discourse. However, a deeply
interdependent parsociety is designed to maximize free consent and redistribute
political power to prevent this kind of "bullying" from happening.
49. This is often called the Persistent Objector Problem in international law. See
Louis Henkin, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 87-91 (3d ed. 1993).
Parlaw's solution is to declare the problem overstated. The legitimacy of customary
law is actually better preserved by giving people the opportunity to withdraw their
consent to the practice at issue. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 102, reporter's note 2 (1987) ("That a rule of customary law is not binding on
any state indicating its dissent during the development of the rule is an accepted
application of the traditional principle that international law essentially depends on
the consent of states").
50. Shalom, supra note 16, at 7.6.
51. Definition based on MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICrIONARY OF LAW 189 (1996),
available at http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=federalism (federalism is a
2009]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
parsociety flips the traditional federalist balance of power on its head;
local communities now have substantially more power relative to
regional representative bodies. This framework creates a floating
hierarchy, as opposed to a pyramidal structure where the people at
the top develop the law for everyone else. 2
In this structure the first level councils would choose a
representative to attend the second level council. This second level
council would then choose a representative to participate in the third
level council and so on. In this way, the number of people
represented at each level of counsel increases exponentially, as shown
in the table below. The size of the first level council is a number
chosen for illustrative purposes but is within the range of 25-50 that
Shalom indicated 3
Table Council
1 Level 1 2 3
People
Represented 40 1600 64000
4 5 6
2.56M 102.4M 4.096B
Each representative would be accountable directly to the council
who elected him and be recallable at will. 54 This representational
structure is much more similar to an agency relationship than that of a
modern democracy.5 The representative either conforms to the
council constituency or, absent good justification, is replaced.
One concern created by parlaw's federalism is what to do when a
local community refuses to honor a broader agreement. Parlaw is
hostile to the notion of a centralized judiciary and rather resembles a
huge network of agreed upon dispute resolutions.6 An independent
distribution of power in a federation between the central authority and the
constituent units).
52. Holterman, supra note 36, at 58.
53. All representatives 2nd level and up are paid (as part of a "balanced job
complex," which is a concept beyond the scope of this note) and have some sort of
staff assigned to them. Shalom, supra note 16, at 1$ 5.12-5.13.
54. Shalom, supra note 16, at 5.11-5.11.4, 5.5.
55. This relationship is not a pure principal-agent relationship in that the
representative does have some discretion in how issues are resolved at the higher
level council. Shalom talks of every council level being a deliberative body where no
one has an automatic mandate to vote a certain way. Id. at $ 5.4. However,
representatives are much easier to recall in parsociety than at present.
56. This hostility also extends to judicial experts; Shalom advocates that elected
or appointed judges should be replaced with randomly selected citizens (analogous to
[Vol. 32:1
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judiciary still exists, but parties would have to agree to jurisdiction.
Even with a dispute resolution forum in place, there is still the issue
of what happens when an individual or group refuses to abide by the
judicial settlement.
The best answer is that parsociety's nearly equal status of
communities means that reputation damage is much more effective in
creating pressure for compliance. Reputation damage is not to be
taken lightly. For example, even with colossal power disparities and
weak threat of sanctions in the international realm, states still largely
comply with World Court decisions. 7 A small local community, so
much more dependent on others than a centralized state, could risk
being cut off from society if they did not comply with judicial
decisions. This compliance question will be explored in much greater
detail in Part III, but at this point it would be more instructive to set
up an example of parlaw to see how all these principles might work
together.
C. Applying Parlaw: Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentencing
US federal law currently imposes a mandatory minimum
sentence for certain drug related offenses.58 Justice Breyer lamented
the need to uphold mandatory minimum statutes because they "are
fundamentally inconsistent with Congress' simultaneous effort to
create a fair, honest, and rational sentencing system."59 A recent
study concludes that many Americans favor eliminating mandatory
juries). Shalom, supra note 29, at 31. This seems to be an evolution in his thinking,
as Shalom's earlier essay indicates that judges in the law should be elected by
councils with advisory input from attorneys. Shalom, supra note 16, at 13.7.
57. The World Court's (aka International Court of Justice or ICJ) overall rate of
compliance has been measured as high as 80 percent, though more rigid definitions of
compliance can create a sizeable percentage decrease. Colter Paulson, Compliance
with Final Judgments of the International Court of Justice Since 198798 AM J. INT'L
L. 434, 460 (2004) (concluding that ICJ compliance has increased or stayed roughly
the same over the last 20 years, despite his statistics showing a 60 percent compliance
rate in 1987-2004 versus an 80 percent rate over 1946-1987 found by another study).
See also Constanze Schulte, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE (Oxford University Press ed., 2004). This research contrasts with
recent highly publicized American case law regarding and enabling non-compliance
with ICJ judgments. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008).
58. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). All of the recent Supreme Court cases
striking down sentencing laws only address laws going beyond a statutory maximum.
Mandatory minimum sentences are currently legal as per United States v. Harris, 536
U.S. 545 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 570.
2009]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
minimum laws. 6°  Despite this support for repealing the laws,
Congress has shown reluctance in changing them. The end result is
that many Americans are forced to obey a law with which they do not
agree.
Parlaw can sidestep the gap between Congress and the public by
having a mandatory minimums policy decided by local councils. For
example, I currently live on Guerrero Street in San Francisco. If my
street's council is against mandatory minimums for drug sentencing,
then we can deliberate and vote not to have such a law.6' Let us say
that the No Mandatory Minimums vote passes, but the council the
next block over on Valencia Street votes in support of these
minimums. Both laws coexist side by side, and everyone consents to
the law of their council. In order to avoid a conflict of laws, Guerrero
and Valencia streets send representatives to the next highest council
(which I will call the Mission Neighborhood Council) to decide a
policy for Guerrero, Valencia, and all other streets in Mission
District. Let us say that the No Mandatory Minimum vote passes at
this higher council, despite the minority voice of Valencia Street.
In terms of enforcement, it is important to mention that the
Mission District's vote does not invalidate the Valencia Street
Council law. Valencia Street has the right to choose to have tougher
drug sentencing, if they so desire. However, Valencia's mandatory
minimum law only applies to Valencia residents who commit their
crime on Valencia Street.62 A minority member of the Valencia
Street Council could also attempt to challenge the law on
constitutional grounds.
Conflicts in the law's application are resolved by the next highest
council. Should someone from Guerrero Street be arrested on
Valencia Street for a drug crime, the conflict in laws is resolved by
having the regional Mission District Council law govern the case. If
that same person gets arrested in a neighborhood other than the
60. Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc., CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (February, 2002), http://www.soros.org
/initiatives/j ustice/articles-publications/publications/hartpoll_20020201/Hart-Poll.pdf.
61. Guerrero Street has more people in it than that (it would be at least several
Level 2 Councils), but it is easier to have simple names to clarify the example.
62. A minority member of the local council (who would be against mandatory
minimums) could also attempt to challenge the law by seeking an advisory opinion
from a local court asking if the new law conflicts with an old law. The court's opinion
does not nullify the new law, but the local council may reassess their decision if they
inadvertently repealed an old law with their decision.
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Mission District and the two regional laws conflict, then the
interregional council (the San Francisco Council) vote would govern.
Notice how parlaw is more reflective of people's opinions.
People on both Guerrero and Valencia streets get to select their legal
vision and have it enforced as they see fit. Representative decisions
are only used to the extent that broader representation is needed.
Uniformity of results is sacrificed for a true government by the
people.
This example raises a few other points. First, under parlaw an
individual does not to have to deliberate or have their opinion heard
on all of society's minutiae. This perfectly natural impulse is
consistent with parsociety; despite the emphasis on deliberation,
every member of every council need not actively decide every issue.63
The society member who has no energy on mandatory drug
sentencing may not show up for this council meeting, but he or she
may want to show up at the abortion vote the following week. The
key point is that the council member is invited to both meetings; there
is a meaningful opportunity for every person to express their opinion.
Second, this example raises the question of whether a parsociety
would have so many different laws that parlaw would end up a
bureaucratic morass. Admittedly, parlaw does depend heavily on
coordination between groups. Even though a multiplicity of laws may
coexist in a single neighborhood, ease of movement is preserved if
one knows his or her council's position and the relevant regional law.
However, these coordination issues are mere technical problems, as
distinguished from more serious ideological problems like the ones
embedded in the current system. These technical issues are also more
surmountable than at any other point in history: internet and current
cellular phone technology alone can alleviate many of parlaw's
coordination concerns."
63. Shalom makes this point very well:
Just as people vary in their preferences and capacities for music or crafts or
mathematics, so too will they vary in their attitude toward and talent for
politics. So we don't want a polity that requires everyone to value political
participation as much as full-time political activists do today, or that
penalizes those without a flair or an interest in politics by somehow denying
their interests equal consideration. But some degree of participation - less
than that of political fanatics, but more than that of most citizens of capitalist
democracies - is essential.
Shalom, supra note 16, at 1 4.41.
64. Robert Putnam, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 179 (2000) (noting that both the history of the telephone and
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Finally, although parlaw's increased fairness may decrease
efficiency in some ways, it also includes the freedom to adjust the
balance between these two values. If a council desires higher
efficiency, parlaw can accommodate. For example, on less polarizing
decisions, the Valencia and Guerrero councils could just agree to
follow the broader Mission District policy. Society may well prefer
efficiency to fairness sometimes, but parlaw is the only legal system
that allows for a meaningful choice between these two values. In
contrast, rejecting an unfair law in 2008 America will not get you a
fairer law - it will get you arrested.
II. Connecting Parlaw and International Law
Parlaw is certainly more complex than the law of a modern
democracy: how can we speculate whether this kind of law could
work on a global scale? What is the international law of a parsociety?
Well, the short answer is that it functions quite similarly to the
international legal system we have now.
In order to draw the comparison between international law and
parlaw, it is necessary to analyze the theory behind international law
as well as how international law actually functions. Several of the
leading international legal theories of the last century wrote favorably
of voluntary association, custom, and federalism. Kelsen, Scelle,
Lauterpacht, and Morgenthau all wrote in favor of these features
embedded in parlaw to one degree or another, as will be explored
below.
International law is described as being different in kind from
state-made law because of its reliance on voluntary association.
German theorist Carl Bergbohm, writing in 1876, believed that
international law emanated not from moral ideals but from self-
legislation.65 Morgenthau also spoke in this vein when he said that the
only sources of international law are necessity and mutual consent.6
Laws of necessity are fundamental to belonging in the given (state
centered) legal order, such as respect for territorial sovereignty
the early evidence on Internet usage strongly suggest that these technologies will
complement face-to-face community).
65. Martti Koskenniemi, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 186 (2002).
66. Hans Morgenthau, THE POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (1948), reprinted in
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 18, at 40.
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limits." The "main bulk of the rules"' creating binding obligations in
international law are the laws of mutual consent - the ones member
states voluntarily choose to make and enforce.
On the other hand, the United Nations is predicated on being
more than voluntary association. The U.N. Charter demands that
even non-member states act in accordance with the principles of the
Charter if international peace and security is at issue.69  Under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, actions in response to aggression or
other threats to the peace can be initiated without consent of the
affected state; however, Article 33 states that voluntary mechanisms
should be tried first.7 ° In addition, the General Assembly often
declares legal obligations regardless of whether the relevant parties
consent to be bound by them.7 Finally, certain norms are considered
so universal that they cannot be derogated from, whether or not the
violator has signed the relevant treaty. These jus cogens norms
include, for example, bans on genocide and slavery.
In practice, these rules are far from universal; even in the
presence of a clear violation, the United Nations is habitually unable
to enforce its proclamations. International courts almost never have
jurisdiction to hear a contentious case without first obtaining state
consent (including the International Court of Justice and the
International Criminal Court). 3 Chapter VII missions are selectively
67. Morgenthau, supra note 66, at 40.
68. Id.
69. UN Charter art. 2, para. 6.
70. UN Charter art. 33 ("The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of
all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means of their own choice") (my emphasis). The Security Council has authority to
bypass this language under Article 42 of the Charter, which says that action can be
taken if solutions not involving armed force are "inadequate or have proven to be
inadequate." Id. at art. 42.
71. One recent example is where the General Assembly, after receiving an ICJ
advisory opinion, demanded in 2004 that Israel cease constructing their settlement
wall and make reparations. G.A. Res. A/ES-10/L.18/Rev.1 (July 20, 2004).
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 cmt. n (1987).
73. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1060
[hereinafter Statute of the ICJ]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
adopted on July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002). The ICC
does allow for the UN Security Council to refer cases without party consent, but the
Security Council can only do this under the aforementioned Chapter VII. Id. at art.
13(b). Of course (and as the Supreme Court has recently decided), even agreeing to
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enforced and solely determined by the U.N. Security Council
("UNSC"); thus, a veto by any single permanent member will
forestall enforcement." The General Assembly is only permitted to
discuss issues,75 initiate studies,76 and make recommendations; 77 their
declarations of law are non-binding, however well intentioned or well
reasoned they may be. Even jus cogens violations are not universally
prosecuted; compare the work done by the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda with the absent accountability for genocide in
Guatemala. 7
International law is enforced in such a selective fashion that it is
inaccurate to call it a binding set of rules analogous to domestic law.
International law is (excepting times when the UNSC invokes
Chapter VII) more accurately described as voluntarily undertaken
obligations that risk becoming distorted and abandoned because of
state-to-state politics. Voluntary association better describes the UN
system's reality, if not the stated goal.
The reliance on custom in parlaw is also reflected in international
law. Customary law is recognized as a primary source of international
law in the Statute of the International Court of Justice.79 Customary
law's primacy naturally follows from international law's decentralized
nature. Lauterpacht recognized customary law's role in the
international realm and advocated for "flexible approaches" to
ascertain it.8° In the absence of a binding international legislature,
customary practice is needed to supplement treaties and create the
the jurisdiction of an international court does not give that court judgment the effect
of domestic law. Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1359 (explaining that a "bare grant of
jurisdiction" says nothing about the effect of an international court judgment).
74. The Security Council's arbitrary enforcement of laws and its distinctly non-
representative makeup have led many to conclude that the Security Council functions
more like a political body than a legal one. See Jose E. Alvarez, Editorial
Comments, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. INT'L LAW 873, 874-86
(2003).
75. UN Charter art. 10.
76. Id. at art. 13.
77. Id at art. 14.
78. UNSC 955 (Nov. 8, 1994); no comparable tribunal was set up in Guatemala,
despite a UN Truth Commission determining that "acts of genocide" had occurred
there between 1981-83. Historical Clarification Commission, Guatemala, Memory of
Silence, 1$108- 123, Vol 3, Sec 3204, (February 1999), available at http://shr.aaas.org
/guatemala/ceh/report/english/conc2.html.
79. Statute of the ICJ, supra note 73, art. 38.
80. Hersh Lauterpacht, DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT 368 (Grotius Publ'n Ltd. 1982) (1958).
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necessary array of binding obligations.
As an alternative to the state centered view of the world,
international theorists also argued for world governments run on
federalist principles. Scelle spoke fondly of a federal phenomenon
that would interconnect the world and allow for the end of empires.81
Scelle further characterized individuals as the only real legal
subjects;' this federalism is thus bottom-to-top like in parlaw.
Lauterpacht's stateless vision is also heavily dependent on federalism,
so much so that it has been described as a "federalist utopia."83
The values embedded in parlaw (voluntary association, custom,
and federalism) are all key components in the international legal
system as envisioned by some of its principal theorists. Although
these theorists were not specifically using participatory language,
international law demonstrates that there can be functioning
decentralized law. Rather than criticizing international law as being
powerless to enforce its own principles, the discipline can be reframed
(like parlaw) as being a tradeoff of efficiency for fairness. Seen in this
way, the problem becomes not international law's lack of power, but
rather domestic states' excessive power. The nation-state world need
not be the only reality: As Professor Koskenniemi notes, "[t]he limits
of our imagination are a product of a history that might have gone
another way."'
Despite similarities, parlaw and international law do not
perfectly overlap with each other. The most significant difference
between the two systems is the issue of sovereign territory. Parlaw
emphasizes collective ownership and cooperative economic planning.
In contrast, international law is vigorously protective of state control
over their territory." However, state sovereignty has been criticized
by some of international law's most prominent scholars. Lauterpacht
labeled the prevailing conception of liberal statehood in his day as
"an insurmountable barrier between man and the law of mankind."
He also depicts states as the veil between international law and
human beings. 7 Morgenthau, often regarded as a paragon of
81. Koskenniemi, supra note 65, at 332.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 405.
84. Id. at FM15.
85. UN Charter art. 2, para. 7.
86. Hersh Lauterpacht, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 77 (1950).
87. Koskenniemi, supra note 65, at 365.
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nationalism, actually stressed that a set of tragic choices created the
thirst for national power in international relations." His preference
was a world government with an international police force able to
move across national borders.8 Kelsen also did not accept state
sovereignty as being essential to international law; he noted how
advocates of state sovereignty attempted to lend a purely political
argument the appearance of an irrefutable logical argument.
90
Sovereign states are not necessary in Lauterpacht, Morgenthau, or
Kelsen's international legal visions. These men's passionate
arguments suggest that state sovereignty is not a necessary condition
of international law, or even a desirable one.
III. Compliance With International Law and Parlaw
Parlaw and international law certainly share each other's virtues,
but they may share each other's faults as well. One critical question
in particular presents itself: If international law is so impressively
constructed, why are legal commitments so routinely ignored?
Related to this question, why would parlaw communities comply with
their legal agreements with no state enforcing the rules?
The legal systems of modern democracy ensure compliance by
their centralized and unitary nature; decentralized legal systems like
parlaw and international law sacrifice efficiency in the interest of
preserving consent and autonomy. Parlaw is designed to be more fair
than modern democracy's laws, but this means little if the former is so
inefficient that no one obeys the fairer laws.
This section will analyze this issue by narrowing the focus to one
area of international law with appalling noncompliance: human rights
laws. Compliance for purposes of this note is defined as: agreement
to be bound by a law (through treaty, contract, or customary practice)
and then obeying that law.9' This note will analyze only patterns of
88. Koskenniemi, supra note 65, at 444.
89. Id. at 469.
90. Hans Kelsen, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 124
(Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., Clarendon Press 1992)
(1934). Hopefully the reader feels that the present note manages to avoid Kelsen's
critique!
91. This definition is just a rewording of the one in a recent collection of
compliance essays. COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING
NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 5 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000)
("compliance refers to whether countries in fact adhere to the provisions of the
accord and to the implementing measures that they have instituted").
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compliance with agreed upon laws, and thus does not consider
compliance with human rights norms generally"' or commitments
identified as non-binding.93 The preliminary answer is not that the
international legal system is fatally flawed, but rather that treaties are
often violated because of state motivations that do not exist to the
same degree in a parsociety.
A. Theories of Compliance
There is a wide array of theories for why countries comply with
international law absent top down enforcement. This section
provides a very brief summary of some of the leading theories.9
First, the managerial model holds that managers (states) comply
because of "an iterative process of discourse among the parties, the
treaty organization, and the wider public." 95  States comply with
treaties because their reputations will be damaged otherwise and they
will have less negotiating power in the future. One criticism of this
model, as noted even by its creators Chayes and Chayes, is that the
approach depends on some level of equality and fairness to work." 9
A loss in reputation is meaningless if one country is so powerful that
others have to continue contracting with it anyway.
Second, legal scholar Thomas Franck influentially suggests that
countries comply with treaties because treaties are perceived as
inherently legitimate.' Belief in a law's legitimacy leads to extremely
efficient enforcement due to the moral compunction to obey.9
92. See Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and
Impact of Foreign Human Rights Trials in Latin America, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-3
(2001) (compliance with human rights norms is increasing in Latin America primarily
due to transnational actors rather than legalization of norms).
93. See COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 91.
94. An excellent collection of compliance theories is contained in an anthology
compiled by Harold Koh and Oona Hathaway. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 18.
95. Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 25
(1995).
96. Id at 127 ("fairness considerations can hardly fail to play a major role in this
process"). Harold Koh highlights this issue in his review of Chayes' model when he
emphasizes "what remains unspecified is precisely how the process should account
for such fairness considerations." Harold Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, 106 YALE
L.J. 2599, 2641 (1997).
97. Thomas M. Franck, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
(1995), reprinted in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 18, at 152-68.
98. Ian Hurd, LEGITIMACY AND AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999),
reprinted in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 18, at 149.
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According to this theory, compliance is derived from a synthesis of
two elements: the law's procedural fairness and its distributive
justice.9 More specifically, legitimate laws: i) convey a clear message;
ii) come from some validating symbol (e.g., a courthouse or flag); iii)
treat like cases alike; and iv) have a nexus between secondary and
primary rules (e.g., a specific tax law's nexus with the tax code)."
Franck emphasizes how communities continuously interact with each
other to develop legitimate laws that they will later comply with for
reasons beyond cost-benefit calculations.'0 ' While appealing in
theory, the model can be criticized because there is no reason why
continuous group interactions are going to change everybody's minds
into compliance. 2 This criticism is similar to the one levied against
the managerial model: A treaty's legitimacy depends not just on its
process or its terms, but also on the intentions of actors involved in
negotiating a treaty.
Third, Harold Koh tries to navigate past the flaws in the previous
models by suggesting that people comply with treaties because the
rights contained in them slowly become internalized in the domestic
legal system.0 3 Koh argues that treaties create interactions between
all kinds of transnational actors; thus the self-interest of states is
balanced with the interests of non-governmental organizations,
activists, and economic forces to name but a few.'° All of these actors
exert pressure upon domestic lawmakers to incorporate the terms of
the treaty. This theory may well be an accurate depiction of how
international law can work, but practically this norm internalization
may be a slow road to travel if the treaty is not in the state's
interests.'5
Fourth, a liberal theory of compliance has been developed by
99. Franck, supra note 97, at 152-53.
100. Id. at 161-64. Franck calls to the values of determinacy, symbolic validation,
coherence, and adherence.
101. Id. at 155-56.
102. Harold Koh makes this critique of Franck's "discursive synthesis (of
legitimacy and justice)" in the course of developing his transnational model. Koh,
supra note 96, at 2645.
103. Id. at 2599-659.
104. Id. at 2645-46.
105. Thomas Risse and others have prepared a careful study that, among other
things, analyzes why norm transformation takes so long and how to quicken the
internalization process. Thomas Risse & Stephen C. Ropp, Conclusions, in THE
POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 258-66
(Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999).
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scholars like Anne Marie Slaughter. 1°6 In this context, liberalist
theory argues that democracies should have better human rights
treaty compliance than other political arrangements.'" The notion
that compliance depends on political conditions rests on the idea that
international problems have domestic roots and that, therefore, the
"levers of progressive change in the international system lie in state-
society relations."' ' The liberalism idea extends Kant's "democracies
do not go to war with each other"' 9 idea by suggesting that
democracies better comply with law than non-democracies." ° Some
have criticized this distinction between liberal versus non-liberal
regimes as being too simplistic; the distinction may understate
international cooperation by some (non-democratic) countries while
overstating such cooperation by democratic countries."'
Fifth, the realist school is based on the premise that states create
alliances and comply with treaties only when it serves their own self-
interest.' 2 Realist scholars say that states join human rights treaties
and institutions only to play lip service to them; realists would predict
little relationship between ratification and compliance. "3 A critique
of the realist school is that it assumes state interest is solely focused
on power-maximizing behavior; many strands of realist thought
rigidly dismiss the notion that states cannot be taught to have more
enlightened interests.1
4
A related theory, institutionalism, slightly redirects the realist
argument by emphasizing that (in the present context) that human
rights legal institutions do have some value and are not mere lip
106. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law94 AM. SoC'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 240 (2000), reprinted in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 18, at 94-103.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 100-01.
109. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in APPROACHES TO PEACE: A READER IN
PEACE STUDIES 124 (David Barash ed., 1999) (1795) (republican constitutions are a
prerequisite to perpetual peace).
110. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 18, at 108.
111. Jose E. Alvarez, Interliberal Law.- Comment, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
249, 253 (2000), reprinted in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 18, at 107.
112. See generallyid. at 27-48.
113. This is Oona Hathaway's prediction based on a survey of realist theory by
Carr, Morgenthau, and others. Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
Difference?, 111 Yale L.J. 1935, 1962-63 (2002).
114. This critique is called constructivism in international legal scholarship - state
identities are constructed from a variety of sources. See Martha Finnemore,
NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1996), as reprinted in
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 18, at 112-20.
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service, but the institutions only serve the limited function of
coordinating states' self-interested responses to common problems."'
Institutionalist theorists propose that countries ratify human rights
treaties solely to get reputation benefits; compliance only occurs
when the costs do not interfere with state interest.116
When parlaw is viewed through any of these theories, the
expectation is that compliance with decentralized law would increase
in a parsociety. In a system of federated participatory councils, actors
would bargain from positions of closer equality than the current
system. The managerial and Franck models suggest compliance with
parlaw because a participatory economy creates more resource
sharing and interdependence than current economic/political regimes.
A community in a parsociety would run a great risk by being
indifferent to its reputation or a treaty's legitimacy because of the
deep interdependence inherent in the model. Under Koh's approach,
norm internalization happens as before, but, with state self-interest, is
removed from the calculation. It is possible that treaties will
incorporate into parlaw faster and more efficiently when state interest
affects the process. Consistent with liberalism's domestic democracy
emphasis, a parsociety is intended to be the most democratic form of
society reasonably possible. Finally, with respect to the realist and
institutionalist schools, a parsociety's self-interests are more
consonant with their population's interests, creating more pressure to
comply with certain treaties (like human rights treaties) than the
incentives influencing today's states.
B. Empirical Evidence on Human Rights Compliance
While theoretically parsociety sounds promising, Oona
Hathaway's landmark 2002 study on human rights treaty compliance
can aid in answering the question of whether there is any empirical
support for a parsociety. 7 Her basic method was to look at rates of
ratification and compliance for the subjects of five human rights
treaties: genocide, torture, fair trials, civil liberties, and women's
political equality. "8  While Hathaway has done the most
115. See generally Robert Keohane, INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THE REALIST
CHALLENGE (1993), reprintedin FOUNDATIONS, supra note 18, at 51-57.
116. This prediction is also Hathaway's after reviewing institutionalist theory.
Hathaway, supra note 113, at 1963.
117. Hathaway, supra note 113, at 1935-2042.
118. Id. at 1968-76.
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comprehensive study on this topic, Linda Keith also did a study
highlighting the lack of compliance with the International Convention
on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR")."
9
Hathaway found that there was often a direct correlation
between better human rights records and more human rights treaties
ratified (specifically with those countries who signed more demanding
Optional Protocols). However, surprisingly, worse human rights
abuses sometimes occurred in countries with high levels of treaty
ratification."
Similarly, Keith concluded that ratifying the ICCPR, after
accounting for other factors, had no "explanatory power" for why
states complied with human rights norms. 2' Both studies found a
level of compliance with human rights treaties that turned out to be
much lower than compliance with economic treaties, such as
International Monetary Fund agreements.1
22
The results of both Hathaway and Keith's studies can be seen as
partial rejections of all five compliance theories mentioned above.
That human rights treaty ratification often precedes greater human
rights abuse cuts against the results expected from the managerial and
Franck theories. Countries routinely ignore potential reputation
damage from disobeying a legitimate treaty. The realist and
institutionalist schools cannot fully explain this data either. Treaty
ratification is not cheap talk or costless compliance: Hathaway found
that ratification had an effect, just more of a negative effect than
anticipated. 23 Koh's transnational theory seems consistent with the
findings, but domestic internalization of human rights treaties is
moving at a glacial pace.
The liberal position is partially undermined by Hathaway's
finding that democracy does not always lead to increased compliance,
119. Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: Does it Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE
RES. 95 (1999).
120. Hathaway, supra note 113, at 1999.
121. Keith, supra note 119, at 112.
122. Other studies focused solely on trade and international monetary agreements
show a closer correlation between ratification and compliance. See Beth A.
Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in
International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819, 832 (2000) (concluding in
her study that a legal commitment may carry decisive weight in determining some
states' international monetary policy).
123. Hathaway, supra note 113, at 2001.
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but full democracies did tend to have better compliance with human
rights treaties.12  So, the degree of democracy may be relevant in
assessing human rights compliance. In fact, several other studies
show a correlation between the degree of democracy and respect for
human rights generally,' 25 although this correlation may be weaker in
the economic world.
26
Hathaway and Keith both note that many compliance theorists
ignore the fact that states use treaties not just as instruments of
change, but also as political expressions. 127 When treaties have
minimal enforcement provisions, countries can ignore the treaty while
still getting the public relations boost from ratification." This
explains why countries with particularly bad human rights records
may ratify treaties at a similar rate as countries with good human
rights records. It also explains the degree of democracy correlation:
public pressure may be more effective in societies with more
entrenched democracy.
29
Certainly, Hathaway and Keith's results can be interpreted in a
variety of other ways. For example, it is entirely possible that the
ratification-compliance gap is because governments may not have the
requisite authority or legitimacy to enforce treaties.3  It is also
possible that other factors alter human rights compliance rates and
124. Hathaway, supra note 113, at 2004.
125. Keith cites to several such studies in a footnote. Keith, supra note 119, at 108.
See Conway W. Henderson, Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression, 35
J. OF CONFLICT RES. 120-42 (1991); Steven Poe & Neal Tate, Repression of Human
Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis, 88 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
853-72 (1994); Douglas Hibbs, MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE: A CROSS-NATIONAL
CAUSAL ANALYSIS (1973); Christian Davenport, Multi-Dimensional Threat
Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry Into Why States Apply Negative
Sanctions, 39 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 683-713 (1995).
126. Simmons concluded that participatory democracy has "little to do" with
monetary policy compliance. Simmons, supra note 122, at 832. But see Alvarez,
supra note 111, at 106 (also disagreeing with democracy being "the explanatory
(compliance) factor," but commenting that the three prime examples of American
treaties being enforced in domestic courts are all economic/trade in character).
Other empirical studies have concluded that democracies better comply with trade
agreements than other states. Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner & B. Peter
Rosendorff, Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International
Trade Agreements, 56 INT'L O RG. 477, 479 (2002).
127. Hathaway, supra note 113, at 2004-10; Keith, supra note 119, at 112.
128. Id.
129. Hathaway, supra note 113, at 2019.
130. Id. at 2010-11.
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cloud the data."' Despite these possibilities, the studies, when
interpreted conservatively present three relevant conclusions: i) there
is a tendency to comply less with human rights treaties than
international economic agreements; ii) Koh's transnational
internalization may be taking longer than expected because states
ratify treaties as mere expressions with little intention of
implementing them; and iii) more developed democracies lead to
greater respect for human rights and better human rights treaty
compliance.
C. Applying the Empirical Results to Parlaw
The three conclusions drawn from Hathaway and Keith's studies
support the proposition that a society governed by parlaw would
more effectively implement signed human rights treaties.
Participatory principles push a society in the direction of improved
human rights compliance.
Economic treaty compliance is greater than human rights treaty
compliance because, in the former case, the parties with large stakes
in the agreement tend to weigh in on or be present in developing the
treaty. The key beneficiaries of a human rights treaty are generally
vulnerable and abused portions of humanity who, in a bitter irony,
are often third parties to agreements drafted by others."' Human
rights treaties are more like "charitable enactments,"'33 whereas states
or companies making economic agreements have more direct
substantive payoffs for complying. This suggests that treaty
compliance would be greater if people negotiated human rights
treaties in a more participatory way.1 ' Treaty negotiations under
parlaw are more directly representative of vulnerable people's
interests than the negotiators of any currently existing society.
131. Keith did a better job of addressing this issue by using a multivariate analysis
with seven factors (Political Democracy, Population Size, Econ Development, Civil
War Experience, International War Experience, British Cultural Influence, Military
Control, and Leftist Regimes). Keith, supra note 119, at 107-09. See also Hathaway,
supra note 113, at 2037.
132. Hathaway, supra note 113, at 2008.
133. Id. at 2007.
134. This idea does not necessarily clash with Simmons finding that participatory
democratic society does not have a large effect on economic agreement compliance.
The relevant question regarding why nations comply is whether there is participation
by the particular members of society most affected by the agreement. Maybe a
parsociety is not needed to get all the key economic actors represented in a treaty
negotiation, but it may be more necessary with human rights treaties.
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Human rights charitable enactments evolve into agreements where
the actors have direct incentives to comply.
Parlaw provides a more direct connection between the affected
people and the negotiators of a human rights treaty, and thus more
transnational actors participate in the treaty building process. In
current states, only legislatures (and sometimes only executives)
approve treaties.'35 Koh emphasized that the "first step" to better
compliance is to "empower more actors to participate."'36 Parsociety
is designed to create this empowerment: NGOs, activists, community
economic interests, and "moral entrepreneurs"'3 7 are all given a
greater voice in parlaw. Therefore, the norms of a treaty should be
expected to internalize into domestic law faster with parlaw.
Representatives taking empty expressive positions are also harder to
sustain than ever before because of transnational pressure to make
the treaties binding.
Finally, the established correlation between compliance and the
degree of democracy supports parsociety. Parsociety is democratic
theory taken to its outermost limit and the research implies that this
new society would be more likely to have better human rights
compliance than modern democracies. "Implies" is the operative
word in the last sentence; it cannot be said with certainty that the
correlation between fuller democracy and human rights compliance
will continue in a parsociety. However, the trend identified in the
Hathaway study is encouraging for parsociety advocates.
D. Applying Parlaw Example 2: The Hutu-Tutsi Conflict
Parlaw's potential on the international stage can be assessed
using a recent historical case: the 1994 Rwanda genocide. How could
a parsociety in Rwanda have addressed the ethnic violence in ways
government models like modern democracy could not? Ethnic
hatred cannot be contained by any law, but the forces at work in 1994
Rwanda are an illustrative challenge for parsociety.
The Rwandan genocide was largely caused by colonial
interference and powerful extremist groups. Hutu and Tutsi co-
existed relatively peacefully until colonization. When Belgium issued
Hutu/Tutsi identity cards, an ethnic hierarchy was established that set
135. See NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE (Monroe Leigh et al. eds., 1995
& 1999).
136. Koh, supra note 96, at 2656.
137. Id.
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the stage for violence several decades later."8 Tutsis were considered
by Belgium, for race and other reasons, to be superior to the majority
Hutus."3 9  After a protracted civil war, the Hutu government
responded to a power stripping peace settlement by working with
extremist groups to foster hatred of Tutsis and preserve Hutu
power. l"° In early 1994, Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front troops poured
into the country and Hutu President Juv6nal Habyarimana was
assassinated, sparking the violence that left over 500,000 dead.
A parsociety in Rwanda with non-discrimination embedded in
their parlaw42 could have responded to Belgium's actions before
genocidal forces even materialized. This answer is a cheap solution,
though; a functional modern democracy in Rwanda could similarly
have challenged or prevented the racial discrimination before the
genocide occurred. The better question is: given the ethnic hatred in
early 1994, how would a parsociety have responded better than a
modern democracy?
There are several ways that a parsociety with parlaw could have
assisted in the immediate run-up to genocide beyond modern
democracy. First, a parsociety better allows for the Tutsi community
to adjust to conditions in dangerous Hutu-dominated territory.
Under parlaw, new representatives can be selected, votes can be
weighted on certain critical issues, new laws can be implemented
quickly at the primary council level, and communities can even legally
secede. Provided the constitutional structure is preserved, individual
communities using parlaw can dramatically change society without
having to wait for a potentially unsympathetic national legislature.
The differences do not stop there. Second, the non-extremist
Hutu public in Rwanda might have been more resistant to human
138. Michael Barnett, EYEWITNESS TO A GENOCIDE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND
RWANDA 50-52 (2002).
139. Human Rights Watch, History, in LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY:
GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/
Genol-3-01.htm#P6_41. See also Phillip Gourevich, WE WISH TO INFORM You THAT
TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES (1998); Chris Taylor,
SACRIFICE AS TERROR: THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE OF 1994 (1999).
140. Human Rights Watch, The Genocide, in LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY,
supra note 139, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Genol-3-02.htm
#P81_34172.
141. Id.
142. Systemic racial discrimination is a current violation of customary
international law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702,
cmt. a (1987).
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rights non-compliance because they would have directly participated
in forming the treaties their government now threatens to violate.
Third, parsociety's deliberation and collective economic planning are
designed to generate solidarity. Specifically, when citizens constantly
have to communicate and cooperate with each other it is nearly
impossible to dehumanize people, which is exactly what occurred
throughout Rwanda's genocide.14 ' Fourth, a parsociety's broad
emphasis on federalism creates a cosmopolitan identity that is not
rooted in national divisions; the international community would be
more likely to act if there were no national boundaries "containing"
interest in the conflict.'"
These forces in parsociety could have helped stabilize 1994
Rwanda and abate the genocidal buildup to one degree or another.
However, the fourth argument on parsociety fostering a cosmopolitan
identity raises a problematic side question: how can any cosmopolitan
identity be forceful enough in a parsociety that would inevitably
inherit the various national identities we have today? This question
goes beyond the Rwanda example and is worth exploring briefly as
the first of a few systemic objections to parlaw.
E. Objections to Parla w
One justification for nation states is that they give their citizens a
national identity."4  Would parsociety's cosmopolitanism be
impossible because it would inevitably challenge preexisting national
identities? This problem is not a theoretical challenge, but it could be
a large practical problem. Identities, even national ones, are not
static; they change over time.14 6 A cosmopolitan identity can evolve
from the current national identities in existence - for example, the
American flag can keep its symbolic value in a cosmopolitan
143. Jean Mukimbiri, The Seven Stages of the Rwandan Genocide, 3 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 823, 836 (2005) (dehumanization occurs at each stage of the genocide
process).
144. Although neighboring countries to Rwanda were obviously affected by the
genocide, a parsociety is designed to create a transnational civil society network that
could spur international action beyond the literal scope of the violence, refugees, etc.
For more on transnational civil society networks, see TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL
SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION (Srilatha Batliwala ed., 2006).
145. Ronald Beiner, Introduction, in THEORIZING NATIONALISM 1-17 (Ronald
Beiner ed., 1999) (summarizing theoretical approaches nationalist identity theory).
146. Id at 6 ("the sheer possession of a given identity confers no normative
authority on the kind of politics that goes with that identity").
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parsociety; it will just symbolize something different than it does at
present. That said, there is the real problem that the nation states do
not want to give their power to the people and will use national
identities and propaganda to preserve their existence.'47 Thus the
practical question of how to transition from the current arrangement
into a society governed by parlaw remains to be explored. This note
does not pretend to solve the practical issues of how one gets from
the current arrangement to a parsociety; it is only exploring if the
destination would be a worthwhile one.
A second potential issue with parlaw is how the model adheres to
its own principles. It is one thing to say that parlaw maximizes
freedom and consent, but determining the "maximum" of these
values is an ongoing challenge. For example, Shalom envisions a
parlaw Constitution that would be more difficult to amend than
normal law so as to preserve certain rights.'48 A constitution is a
significant limit on both freedom and consent because laws cannot
stand if they conflict with constitutional rules. Some constitutions
even have "entrenched rights" that can never be abridged. For
example, the German Constitution articulates certain entrenched
norms.4 9 Perhaps, similarly, the deliberative federal council structure
itself may be an entrenched norm in a parsociety. Even if everyone
agrees that modern democracy shamefully deprives the public of their
consent and their freedom, do constitutions and entrenched norms
enable or conflict with participatory principles? Does the limited
secession right sufficiently preserve consent? A parlaw advocate has
to clearly articulate why their consent restrictions are strictly
necessary while modern democracy's consent restrictions are not.
A third objection to parlaw is the issue of what happens if only
part of the world embraces the new system. A fully realized
parsociety contains the institutions and incentives to handle a group
of Hutu extremists, but what happens if half the world is run by
parlaw and the other by modern democracies and dictators? Parlaw's
decentralized structure and sophisticated coordination make having a
professional, powerful army very difficult. "' A parsociety could be
147. For a study on how this propaganda gets disseminated in the United States,
see Edward S. Herman & Noam Chomsky, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OFTHE MASS MEDIA 1-35 (2002).
148. Stephen Shalom, A Political System for a Good Society (May 19, 2006),
http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/3854.
149. Grundgesetz [Constitution][GG] art. 79(3) (F.R.G).
150. Shalom recognizes this issue by saying that a Parpolity has a citizen army.
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vulnerable to external force from more ruthlessly efficient state
armies."' What this all means is that parsociety may be an odd theory
that works at both extremes, but not in the middle. A small
indigenous society with little strategic value to others could easily
coordinate a parsociety, and the entire world running on the same
principles could protect itself from rogue actors. The middle ground
is where the problem lies. If parsociety succeeds it will be as a
movement without boundaries. As Morgenthau said:
It would be useless and even self destructive to free one or the
other of the peoples of the earth from the desire for power while
leaving it extant in others. If the desire for power cannot be
abolished everywhere in the world, those who might be cured
112would simply fall victims to the power of others.
IV. Conclusion
First, a decentralized state with community owned property (a
parsociety) would have a legal system called parlaw. This legal
system has certain key advantages over the current coercive, under-
representative legal structure. Parlaw can be seen as a tradeoff of
some efficiency in legal enforcement for a fairer law that better
respects people's autonomy.
Second, parlaw is similar to international law. This resemblance
manifests itself both in how international law was envisioned by its
classic theorists and how it functions in real life. This connection can
serve as a response to parsociety critics: A participatory-like legal
system is both possible and presently functioning on a global scale.
Third, parlaw, like international law, could be a role model for
how domestic law should function. However, to establish this point a
threshold problem of international law, that states often do not obey
international law, must be addressed.
To take steps towards answering this question, the fourth step
examines international human rights treaty compliance. A
parsociety, at least in the human rights field, would have greater
compliance as compared to current states, even modern democracies.
Shalom, supra note 16, at 13.1.4.
151. Past decentralized society experiments have been destroyed this way. For a
historical/social and a first hand account on the demise of the anarchist and
communist syndicates in the Spanish Civil War, see Daniel Guerin, ANARCHISM 114-
43 (1970); George Orwell, HOMAGE TO CATALONIA (Harcourt 2003) (1938).
152. Morgenthau, supra note 66, at 34.
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Fears of parlaw leading to gross non-compliance are less persuasive if
the evidence points to parsociety having a higher human rights law
compliance than a modern democracy. If a parsociety complies with
decentralized law better than expected, then the efficiency of legal
enforcement lost from switching to parlaw is overstated. These
arguments suggest that parlaw can be complied with enough to make
the increase in fairness and autonomy worthwhile; if this is true, then
parlaw is indeed a model for what domestic law should be.
International law rarely looks at itself through the lens of
participatory values, but these values give new legitimacy and insight
into this area of law. Huge swaths of U.N. reform proposals are
trying to make international law more like domestic legal systems:
more centralized, more coercive power, etc."53 Parlaw theory suggests
that these reforms are unnecessary, perhaps even against the spirit of
the international legal system.
Sometimes people create something with virtues beyond their
own expectations. The factory workers in Argentina did not set out
to inspire visions of a new society, but inspire they have.
International law's virtues may exist the same way. Perhaps it is not
as powerful as its framers envisioned, but for all the cruel shots
international law has taken over the years, now may be the time to
embrace it for what it is.
153. One example of this style of U.N. reform is expanding permanent U.N.
Security Council Membership. See Simon Chesterman et al., LAW AND PRACTICE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 566 (2008). Another example is the exponentially increasing
number of UN peacekeeping missions. While peacekeeping missions spring from
benevolent motives and have numerous positive effects, the lack of accountability for
extreme force and human rights abuses greatly undercuts the legitimacy of these
missions. See Matt Halting & Blaine Bookey, Comment, Peacekeeping in Name
Alone - Accountability for the UNin Haiti, 31 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 461
(2008).
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